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INTRODUCTION

In Minnesota, the evolutions of the related common law
doctrines res judicata and collateral estoppel have produced a
magnitude of complex interpretive challenges for Minnesota
courts. The dilemma has generated serious discussion within the
judiciary and the needless encroachment by the legislature within
the province of regulating judicial procedure exacerbated this
dilemma. Minnesota recently attempted to resolve this dispute,
redefining the relationship between judicial procedure and the
legislature by outlining a more detailed blueprint by which to apply
collateral estoppel.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel exists to bar “a party from
relitigating an issue determined against that party in an earlier
action, even if the second action differs significantly from the first
1
one.” In essence, “collateral estoppel stands for the principle of
2
The doctrine seeks to avoid duplicative
issue preclusion.”
litigation, achieve consistency of judgments, preserve the public
trust, and conserve resources by protecting past litigants from the
3
adverse consequences of relitigation. While a party to the prior
action is absolutely barred from relitigating the same issue,
authority is split as to whether the doctrine estopps the party’s
4
Since the early nineteenth century, proponents of
privies.
collateral estoppel urged that prior rulings also bar privies from
relitigation; recalling Jeremy Bentham, who called the requirement
5
of mutuality “illogical and ill-founded.”
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the various specific
types of collateral estoppel, but generally explaining collateral estoppel as being
applicable even when the second action differs from the first).
2. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 658 (Minn. 2007) (citing Hauschildt v.
Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004)).
See generally JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9 (4th ed. 2005) (explaining the
differences between collateral estoppel, which is issue preclusion; whereas res
judicata is claim preclusion).
3. Grover Hartt, III & Jonathan L. Blacker, Judicial Application of Issue
Preclusion in Tax Litigation: Illusion or Illumination?, 59 TAX LAW. 205, 208–09 (2005)
(discussing the broad goals of issue preclusion, before moving into a discussion of
how the doctrine specifically bars relitigation in partnership tax proceedings in
section IV.C).
4. 50 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS § 831 (2008) (outlining the requirements for
determining which parties will be bound for the purposes of collateral estoppel by
a prior ruling, and recognizing that there is not a definitive answer to whether
privies should be bound by such rulings).
5. Jack Ratliff, Offensive Collateral Estoppel and the Option Effect, 67 TEX. L. REV.
63, 72 (1988) (citing to JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 7 WORKS OF
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The Minnesota Supreme Court recently addressed the degree
of privity required between state agencies to bind a party for the
purposes of collateral estoppel in driving while intoxicated (DWI)
6
proceedings in State v. Lemmer. In Minnesota, an arrest for DWI
results in a civil implied consent hearing against the Commissioner
7
of Public Safety and a criminal DWI prosecution by the state. In
2002, the state legislature enacted subdivision (3)(g) to section
169A.53 of the Minnesota Statutes, precluding defensive collateral
estoppel against the state in the criminal proceeding based on
8
rulings made in district court during the implied consent hearing.
The Lemmer case arrived before the Minnesota Supreme Court in
2007, arising from a dispute over an order by the court of appeals
that upheld the constitutionality of section 169A.53(3)(g), which
permits the state to relitigate issues previously determined in
9
Lemmer’s implied consent hearing. The court affirmed that the
two state agencies involved in DWI proceedings were not in privity
10
and remanded Lemmer’s case to trial.
This note begins by presenting a brief history of issue
preclusion before proceeding to discuss the evolution of the privity
requirements under collateral estoppel in Minnesota DWI cases. It
then examines the Lemmer case to understand why the Minnesota
Supreme Court determined that collateral estoppel did not apply.
Finally, this note concludes with an analysis of public policy
concerns to illustrate some potential ways that the Lemmer decision
may impede judicial efficiency and debase public trust in the
judiciary.

JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed., 1843)).
6. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660–61.
7. Id. at 654. There are two proceedings resultant to DWI arrests in
Minnesota: first, there is the civil action for driver’s license revocation; and
second, the criminal prosecution. See MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.50–53 (2006).
8. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 655–56 (explaining that the legislature abrogated
the decision reached in State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
The legislation was created when Minnesota Statute section 169A.53(3)(g) was
adopted on April 4, 2002, making clear that the implied consent hearing no
longer gives rise to collateral estoppel in criminal prosecutions. See Act of Apr. 4,
2002, ch. 314, § 1 subdiv. 3(g), 2002 Minn. Laws 509–11 (codified as amended at
MINN. STAT. § 169A.53(3)(g)). The significance of this passage is in the fact that
the court recognized that the legislature deliberately challenged what the court
ruled a procedural mechanism, illustrating that the court allowed the legislature
to involve itself in the distinct province of the judiciary.
9. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653–54.
10. Id. at 663.
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II. EVOLUTION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN MINNESOTA
A. Early Common Law Roots
“Collateral estoppel has long been an important part of Anglo11
American common law.” The doctrine is believed to stem from
12
the Roman principle of res judicata and Germanic ideas of equity,
holding that parties of past litigation were estopped from
13
Prior to the adoption of
relitigating previously decided issues.
collateral estoppel by English courts, the structure of the writ
system encouraged duplicative litigation by offering nominally
14
different causes of action to be applied to the same facts.
Protective mechanisms aimed at preventing the harms of
duplicative suits progressed and became incorporated into the
fabric of the English common law system, ultimately taking shape as
the doctrine of “estoppel by record” first cited in 1803 by the King’s
15
This type of estoppel was later
Bench in Outram v. Morewood.
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Hopkins v. Lee in
16
1821. Civil proceedings in the American courts first recognized
the expansion of the doctrine to privies of prior litigants in 1876, as

11. Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral Estoppel
in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REV. 1379, 1390 (1994) (discussing the rapid evolution
and development of the collateral estoppel doctrine in American common law).
12. Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in
Continental and Anglo-American Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 238, (1940) (explaining the
roots of the doctrine of collateral estoppel and their development in American
jurisprudence).
13. Charles William Hendricks, 100 Years of Double Jeopardy Erosion: Collateral
Estoppel Made Extinct, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 379, 391–92 (2000) (positing that the roots
of collateral estoppel share some history with the Roman ideas of res judicata, but
that the specific feature of collateral estoppel evolved from “Germanic origins.”
The article then discusses the evolution of the doctrine in the criminal arena
under the provisions of the 5th Amendment of the United States Constitution).
14. See Colin Hugh Buckley, Issue Preclusion and Issues of Law: A Doctrinal
Framework Based on Rules of Recognition, Jurisdiction and Legal History, 24 HOUS. L.
REV. 875, 877 (1987) (examining the flaws in the application of collateral
estoppel). Mr. Buckley posits that the rules of the doctrine lack structure and rely
too heavily on ad hoc policy considerations. Id. at 880–81.
15. Hendricks, supra note 13, at 391 (citing the British adoption of civil
collateral estoppel in Outram v. Morewood, 102 Eng. Rep. 630, 633 (K.B. 1803)).
16. Hopkins v. Lee, 19 U.S. 109, 113 (1821). An early discussion of collateral
estoppel declaring a litigant may not take the same issue to another venue to
relitigate a “fact which has been directly tried, and decided by a Court of
competent jurisdiction, cannot be contested again between the same parties . . . .”
Id.
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17

acknowledged in Cromwell v. County of Sac.
Over time, the doctrine of collateral estoppel developed in the
American common law and was recorded in the Restatement (First) of
Judgments in 1942, where it was written that any fact actually
litigated to finality would be conclusive in subsequent litigation
18
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
between the parties.
expanded this concept to include prior conclusions made on the
19
Each state is free to determine the application of
law as well.
common law nuances, but “all states have adopted the common law
20
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel in some form.”
B. Minnesota and the Mutuality Requirement
Minnesota’s modern common law understanding of the
doctrine explains that previous decisions are conclusive in
subsequent actions when a party can demonstrate that “(1) [the]
issue is identical to one in prior adjudication; (2) there is a final
judgment on the merits; (3) [the] estopped party [is the same]
party or in privity with [the] party to prior adjudication; and (4)
[the] estopped party was given full and fair opportunity to be heard
21
on adjudicated issue.”
Despite a nominal commitment to the generally understood
principles of collateral estoppel, Minnesota lastingly adhered to the
rule that findings made at DWI implied consent hearings did not
collaterally estop prosecutors from relitigating the same issues
22
This facilitated DWI
during the later criminal prosecution.
proceedings that resembled the early “doctrine of mutuality of the
parties,” which originally functioned to exclusively restrict collateral
17. Hendricks, supra note 13, at 391 (attributing the inception of applying
civil collateral estoppel against privies of prior litigants as well as to the prior
adjudicated parties to Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876)).
18. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 68(1) (1942).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
20. Pamela A. Mann, Federalism Issues and Title VII: Kremer v. Chemical
Construction Corp., 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 423 (1985) (discussing the
ways in which preclusion principles have been adopted by all of the states and the
federal courts).
21. 1 DAVID F. HERR & ROGER S. HAYDOCK, MINNESOTA PRACTICE, CIVIL RULES
ANNOTATED, RULE 8.03, § 8.5 (4th ed. 2008) (citing AFSCME Council No. 14, Local
Union No. 517 v. Washington County Bd. of Comm'rs, 527 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1995)).
22. 9A HENRY W. MCCARR & JACK S. NORDBY, MINN. PRAC. § 56.33 (3d ed. 2007)
(discussing the state of Minnesota law prior to the decision in State v. Victorsen, 627
N.W.2d 655 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001)).
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estoppel for use against persons who were named as parties in the
23
prior litigation.
Jurisdictions who had once maintained this historical
limitation upon defensive collateral estoppel realized the attendant
costs, and sought to strengthen estoppel by broadening its scope by
24
Many jurisdictions
“rejection[] of the mutuality requirement.”
rejected mutuality, endorsing the California Supreme Court’s 1942
“landmark” rejection of the doctrine of mutuality in Bernhard v.
25
The
Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association.
rejection of mutuality attained even greater status in 1971, when
the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected mutuality in
26
Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.
The Court agreed that the doctrine of mutuality was undergoing a
“fundamental change” because “an increasing number of courts
27
have rejected the principle as unsound.” Although the language
used by the Court indicates that it may not have intended for this
rejection of mutuality to be universally applied beyond the sphere
of patent and trademark litigation, “the federal courts embraced
the Supreme Court’s approach and applied it to a variety of cases.”
28
Following the federal system’s lead, “[m]any but not all state

23. Donald L. Catlett, Charles D. Moreland & Janet M. Thompson, Collateral
Estoppel in Criminal Cases: How and Where Does It Apply?, 62 J. MO. B. 370, 370 (Nov.Dec., 2006) (explaining that judgments evolved under the doctrine to estop
litigants who were in privity with the prior party subsequent to the more limited
earlier understandings of the doctrine that required a strict showing of mutuality
of the parties).
24. Id.
25. Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Federal or State Law as Governing in Matters of
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Federal Tort Claims Act Suit, 49 A.L.R. FED. 326
(1980) (citing Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892
(Cal. 1942)) (because most states have abandoned the mutuality of estoppel, and
because most federal courts defer to state law on the issue, it can be said that most
jurisdictions abandoned mutuality).
26. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). This was an early case that dealt with the framework
for collateral estoppel. It did not address the same kind of collateral estoppel that
was being discussed in the Lemmer case. It should be noted that while Lemmer was
asking the court to acknowledge that defensive collateral estoppel should apply to
his DWI case, Blonder-Tongue is discussing the fact that collateral estoppel may also
be used offensively, that is, to preclude a defendant from suing a plaintiff who had
previously won in a final disposition of an identical claim by a similarly situated
defendant. This case is cited for the proposition that mutuality was being
abandoned and that expansion is applicable regardless of which type of collateral
estoppel the court applies.
27. Id. at 327. See also Hartt, supra note 3, at 211.
28. Hartt, supra note 3, at 211–12.
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29

courts have rejected the mutuality requirement.” It would not be
until 1990 that Minnesota’s conceptualization of collateral estoppel
30
would expressly abandon the doctrine of mutuality.
As the judiciary recognized “the erosion of the mutuality
doctrine, the courts expanded the application of collateral
31
estoppel.” More specifically, the evolution of the aforementioned
doctrines illustrates a general trend towards establishing a more
unrestrained recognition of privity between related litigants. This
expansive approach was declared over thirty years ago when the
court posited the federal majority rule was that “[a] person may be
bound by a judgment even though not a party if one of the parties
to the suit is so closely aligned with his interests as to be his virtual
32
representative.”
C. Minnesota Mutuality in DWI Proceedings
1.

State v. Juarez

One of the earlier Minnesota cases in the chain of case law
33
Juarez was
preceding Lemmer was the 1984 case State v. Juarez.
factually similar to Lemmer in that Commissioner of Public Safety
34
Juarez
represented the state at the implied consent hearing.
argued that there was no reasonable basis to give him a
35
At the implied consent
breathalyzer test during a traffic stop.
36
hearing, the district court agreed, dismissing the case. The City of
37
Burnsville represented the state at the subsequent criminal trial.
In that proceeding, Juarez was able to collaterally estop the

29. Rydstrom, supra note 25, at 326.
30. Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1990).
Prior to Aufderhar, Minnesota courts had adopted as the governing principle that:
[t]he requirement of mutuality must yield to public policy. To hold
otherwise would be to allow repeated litigation of identical questions,
expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant having lost on a question of
fact to re-open and re-try all the old issues each time he can obtain a new
adversary not in privity with his former one.
Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 256, 72 N.W.2d 364, 369 (1955) (quoting
Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 262 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934)).
31. See Hartt, supra note 3, at 212.
32. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710, 719 (5th Cir. 1975).
33. State v. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d 801 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
34. Id. at 802.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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prosecution from introducing evidence collected during the stop.
The state appealed and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
39
reviewed the applicability of collateral estoppel in this instance.
40
The court applied State v. House for the proposition that the
Commissioner of Public Safety is not the same party as the City of
Burnsville and is therefore free to relitigate the evidentiary rulings
41
of the implied consent hearing. The issue was remanded, leaving
the Minnesota rule clear that collateral estoppel may not apply
42
between these government agencies.
2.

State v. Victorsen

In 2001, Minnesota seemed to change its position, aligning
itself more closely to the modern majority opinion when the
43
Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled on State v. Victorsen. Rejecting
the State’s arguments that it did not have fair notice to
44
participate, the court found that the Commissioner of Public
Safety and the State of Minnesota were in privity for the purposes
of DWI prosecution and that findings made in the civil implied
consent action would bind in district court during the subsequent
45
criminal prosecution. This opinion was also in line with other
jurisdictions regarding the notion that determinations made in the
46
civil action may be binding during a subsequent criminal action.
This shift toward a more liberal privity requirement was shortlived; Minnesota almost immediately reverted towards mutuality
when the Minnesota legislature “acted purposefully to abrogate the

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 192 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
41. Juarez, 345 N.W. 2d at 802.
42. Id. at 803.
43. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655, 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (speaking
to the idea that collateral estoppel would apply because there was privity between
the Commissioner of Public Safety and the State of Minnesota, thereby overruling
the previous leading Minnesota case, which had established that privity did not
exist between the agencies); cf. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d at 802.
44. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662–63.
45. Id. at 661 (recognizing privity between two state agencies based on the
fact that the state is the real party at interest).
46. See Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Doctrine of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel
as Barring Relitigation in State Criminal Proceedings of Issues Previously Decided in
Administrative Proceedings, 30 A.L.R. 4th 856 (1984) (discussing that most
jurisdictions recognize the application of collateral estoppel in criminal
proceedings, whether the prior action be civil or administrative).
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47

holding in Victorsen” by enacting section 169A.53(3)(g) during the
48
This statutory
following legislative session in April of 2002.
amendment precluded a defendant from invoking collateral
estoppel during a criminal prosecution on any ruling made at the
49
implied- consent hearing.
In November of 2005, the legislature’s power to enact a statute
governing collateral estoppel was successfully challenged in State v.
Brunclik, when the constitutionality of section 169A.53(3)(g) was
50
The Goodhue County court hearing the
called into question.
argument held that the statute violated the separation of powers
doctrine by allowing the legislature to amend court procedures and
issued an injunction against all state agencies, precluding them
51
from enforcing section 169A.53(3)(g).
D. The Effect of Lemmer on Collateral Estoppel
All of the aforementioned constitutional conclusions were
validated when the district court, initially hearing Ronald
Lemmer’s criminal case, dismissed the charges against Lemmer
52
During the state’s appeal, the
based on the civil ruling.
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the Brunclik injunction was
sufficiently preserved for review by reference in the trial court
53
The court then reexamined its authority to issue an
record.
injunction overturning the constitutionality of legislative
54
modification to collateral estoppel
During the appeal, the question that would determine the
application of collateral estoppel in Minnesota became whether or
not the district court erred in adopting the Brunclik injunction
55
previously issued by the Goodhue County court. The appellate
court focused on distinguishing between the substantive and the
procedural nature of collateral estoppel, reasoning that only
47. State v. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d 657, 661 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
48. See MINN. STAT. § 169A.53(3)(g).
49. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 655–56 (Minn. 2007). The court writes
that the enactment of section 169A.53(3)(g) was done to abrogate the Victorsen
ruling. Id. at 655.
50. Id. at 654 (discussing State v. Brunclik, No. T8-04-4705 (Minn. Dist. Ct.,
Nov. 8, 2005)).
51. Id. at 656.
52. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 661.
53. Id. at 661.
54. Id. at 663–64.
55. Id. at 661–62.
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substantive law was within the legislature’s scope of constitutional
authority, and thereby not subject to the judiciary striking it
56
down. The Minnesota Court of Appeals ultimately determined to
align itself with “the federal courts, including the Eighth Circuit,
[which] have arrived at near unanimity... concluding that it is
57
substantive.” It was this finding that led the court to conclude
that the legislature could mandate the use of collateral estoppel
58
and that section 169A.53(3)(g) was in fact constitutional. Having
so held, the appellate court reversed the earlier decision as clear
error on the part of the district court for wrongfully determining
that section 169A.53(3)(g) was procedural and thereby
59
60
unconstitutional. Lemmer was remanded for rehearing.
Confusion resulted from the contradictory understandings
encompassed within these holdings, creating a fundamental rift in
the interpretation of collateral estoppel in Minnesota. The
disparity between the Brunclik injunction and the Lemmer appeal
resulted in the creation of legislative authority to deny collateral
estoppel, raising still more questions about the separation of
powers between the state legislature and the judiciary. It was on
these questions that Lemmer again appealed, and in 2007, the
Minnesota Supreme Court attended to whether the legislature held
the constitutional authority to dictate the application of collateral
61
estoppel and whether the two state agencies were in privity.
III. THE LEMMER CASE
A. Factual Background
On June 4, 2005, the Scott County Sheriff’s department was in
pursuit of a suspect who had reportedly fled the scene of an
62
automobile accident to the residence of Ronald Lemmer. The
63
suspect took Lemmer’s boat with Lemmer as his passenger. The
suspect was arrested, and Lemmer began driving the boat back to
64
his home. During Lemmer’s operation of the boat, the Deputy
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 662.
Id. at 663.
Id. at 660.
Id. at 664.
See State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650 (Minn. 2007).
Id. at 653.
Id.
Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/5

10

Partridge: Civil Procedure: Reviving Mutuality: Restricting the Application

694

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

Sherriff stopped Lemmer, boarded the boat, reportedly observed
Lemmer’s intoxication and arrested Lemmer for operation of a
65
Lemmer was charged with a
motor vehicle while intoxicated.
66
third-degree DWI.
At his implied consent hearing against the Commissioner of
Public Safety, the district court overturned the revocation of
Lemmer’s driver’s license because the evidence against Lemmer
had been obtained during an unconstitutional stop for which there
67
had been no “particularized and objective basis.” The state later
tried Lemmer on criminal DWI charges and Lemmer moved to
dismiss them on the theory that the doctrine of collateral estoppel
precluded the state from relitigating the evidentiary findings made
68
in his civil hearing.
B. Procedural Posture of Lemmer
The district court agreed that the relitigation of the evidentiary
ruling made at the implied consent hearing was unconstitutional
because the legislature’s enactment of section 169A.53(3)(g) was a
regulation of judicial procedure, and thereby a violation of the
69
separation of powers doctrine. The court dismissed the criminal
70
charges against Lemmer and the state appealed.
C. An Appeal for Comity
Lemmer argued that an appeal should not be granted because
the state was collaterally attacking the judicially created law
contained in the Brunclik order, but the court of appeals agreed
with the state that the statute is constitutional despite the Brunclik
65. Id.
66. Id. at 653. Motorboats are motor vehicles under Minnesota law. MINN.
STAT. § 169A.03 subdiv. 15. The state charged Lemmer with DWI for operating a
motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over .10 under Minnesota
Statute section 169A.20 subdivision 1. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653. Because
Lemmer had a prior DWI conviction, he was charged with third degree
misdemeanor DWI for the presence of an “aggravating factor” under Minnesota
Statute section 169A.26. Id.
67. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 653. Lemmer was not stopped legally under
Minnesota Constitution article I, section 10, which requires a “particularized and
objective basis” to stop the operator of a motor vehicle. Id. at 659. See also MINN.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
68. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 654.
69. Id.
70. See State v. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006).
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71

injunction. The court of appeals was able to reach this decision
because it held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was
substantive rather than procedural, therefore within the sphere
72
To make this
that the legislature has power to regulate.
connection, the appellate court relied upon an outcomedeterminative test to conclude that the application of collateral
73
The court writes, “if the law is
estoppel was substantive law.
outcome determinative—if it will influence the outcome of the
74
case—then it is substantive and not merely procedural.” To use
the words “outcome determinative” in this expansive sense would
definitely fulfill the substantive standard because reversing the
decision of a district court will always clearly influence the outcome
of the case. As if there were anything that would not meet this
incredibly broad application of the test, the court of appeals went
on to determine that the Lemmer court had not actually relied on
75
Rather, the
the injunction during his criminal trial anyway.
appellate court noted that the district court had merely taken the
76
injunction under advisement in reaching its decision.
The court of appeals goes on to say that regardless of whether
this statute is constitutional, the district court may put aside any
concerns of constitutionality to uphold the statute as a matter of
77
comity. The courts must “exercise great restraint prior to striking
78
down a statute as unconstitutional....” This restraint is the result
of respect for the co-equal branches of government and a tendency
71. Id. at 654. Lemmer moved to strike the state’s argument that the district
court erred in ruling Minnesota Statute § 169A.53 subdiv. 3(g) unconstitutional
because the attack “constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the
injunction issued in Brunclik.” Id. The state supreme court ruled that Lemmer
failed to seek enforcement of the injunction at the district court level. Id. at 656.
Instead, the district court took the existence of the injunction under advisement
and applied it when ruling on the case. Id. Therefore, the state was not
challenging the Brunclik injunction, but rather was challenging whether Brunclik
properly supported the district court’s decision. Id. at 654.
72. See Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 662–64.
73. Id. at 662. The outcome-determinative test is a system used to determine
whether a rule is substantive or procedural. Id. The federal courts typically
employ this test to discern if federal courts should follow state or federal rules on
the grounds that these courts are within the scope of appropriate authority
granted to the judiciary. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
74. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 662 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465–69
(1965)).
75. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656.
76. Id.
77. See Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 663–64.
78. Id. at 662. See also State v. Willis, 332 N.W. 2d 180, 184 (Minn. 1980).
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to grant comity to statutes that do not present a clear invasion of
79
another branch’s authority. The effect of the court of appeals’s
reversal was to preclude Lemmer from asserting collateral estoppel;
80
the case was remanded to district court for new trial. Lemmer
81
appealed this ruling to the Minnesota Supreme Court.
D. Lemmer at the Supreme Court of Minnesota
The outcome of the Lemmer decision by the Minnesota
Supreme Court turned on whether collateral estoppel applies
82
The supreme
between the state agencies as parties in privity.
court began its analysis by first resolving the issues that were central
to Lemmer’s first appeal, namely, whether the denial of collateral
estoppel in DWI proceedings was within the scope of the
83
The court writes “[t]he judicial branch
legislature’s authority.
governs procedural matters, while the creation of substantive law is
84
a legislative function.” The court clarifies this understanding by
analogizing collateral estoppel to an evidentiary ruling, something
that is purely procedural and does not create a substantive change
85
in the law. After correctly applying the substantive law analysis,
the court continues by overturning the appellate court finding on
the ruling regarding collateral estoppel, “conclud[ing] that
86
collateral estoppel is not substantive in function.” Holding that
the application of collateral estoppel is a determination to be made
by the judicial branch, the court next considered whether or not
79. See Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d at 662–64.
80. Id. at 664.
81. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656.
82. See generally id.
83. See id. at 657.
84. Id. (citing State v. Johnson, 514 N.W.2d 551, 554 (Minn. 1994)). The
Johnson court determined that the application of collateral estoppel was not for the
legislature because it is strictly procedural in that “[collateral estoppel] neither
creates a new cause of action nor deprives defendant of any defense on the
merits.” Johnson, 514 N.W.2d at 555 (quoting Strauch v. Superior Court, 107 Cal.
App. 3d 45, 49 (Ct. App. 1980)).
85. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 658.
86. Id. The court elaborates that collateral estoppel is procedural only and
analogous to an evidentiary ruling and strictly for the consideration of the
judiciary. Id. This is not yet codified in article III, section 1 of the Minnesota
Constitution. This section of the constitution still reflects the court of appeals
ruling in State v. Lemmer, 716 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), aff’d, 736 N.W.2d
650 (Minn. 2007) (affirming denial of collateral estoppel, but overruling the
appellate court on the issue of collateral estoppel being a concern of the
legislature).
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87

collateral estoppel should apply in Lemmer’s case.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recites the occasions when
collateral estoppel can be applied:(1) the issue was
identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a
final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication;
and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair
88
opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue.
The court concedes that the first two elements are met, but the
issues of sameness or privity and full opportunity to be heard are
89
not. This was held in large part because the agencies are not the
same—or in privity—and they direct authoritative roles so distinct
from one another that collateral estoppel would interfere with their
90
authority to accomplish their respective duties.
The court also focuses a lot of attention on the fact that the
agencies are represented by different legal counsel, and thereby
not well-represented at the respective proceedings to constitute full
91
and fair opportunity. The court also reasons that each party must
be motivated by self-interest, have controlling participation and the
92
right to appeal to constitute full and fair opportunity to be heard.
The Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the privity reasoning of
the lower court and narrowly affirmed the court of appeals
93
judgment by a 4-3 split.
The essence of the Lemmer decision is to deny collateral
87. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 658–59.
88. Id. at 659.
89. Id. at 659–63.
90. See id. at 661. Applying preclusion would interfere with the proper
allocation of authority between state agencies or officials. See State v. Fritz, 527
A.2d 1157, 1166 (Conn. 1987) (holding that a Connecticut state agency
administrative ruling did not estop the state from relitigating the same issue in a
criminal court). See also State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 125 (W. Va. 1995)
(holding that a ruling made during a West Virginia administrative employee
grievance hearing did not estop the state from relitigating the same issue for
criminal purposes). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 36, cmt. f
(1982).
91. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 661. The statutes establishing the roles of county
attorney and the attorney general, respectively, separate the situations in which
each has jurisdiction and sets forth that each can only be involved in the
proceedings of the other by permission. MINN. STAT. § 388.051 (2006); MINN.
STAT. § 8.06 (2006).
92. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 661 (citing Kaiser v. N. States Power Co., 353
N.W.2d 899, 904 (Minn. 1984); Ramsey v. Stevens, 283 N.W.2d 918, 924 (Minn.
1979)).
93. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 657.
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estoppel in DWI proceedings because: 1) the commissioner of
public safety serves an authoritative role distinctly different from
than that of the state to establish privity; 2) each agency is
represented by different legal counsel; and 3) each agency lacked
the full and fair opportunity to control the litigation in the other’s
94
suit.
IV. DISASSEMBLING THE LEMMER DECISION
A. Introduction
At its heart, Lemmer is a debate as to whether the elements of
collateral estoppel are satisfied by the relationships between the
parties in the present case. The first step in understanding the
court’s refusal to apply collateral estoppel to Lemmer’s case is to
95
note that estoppel is held as a judicial procedural rule. Despite
this attention to constitutional issues, the central focus of Lemmer is
how to apply the rule of collateral estoppel, and not whether the
96
court has the authority to apply the rule. The court ultimately
reaches the conclusion that collateral estoppel is inapplicable
because privity did not exist between the Commissioner of Public
Safety and the state during this DWI proceeding. This conclusion,
however, seems difficult to rectify with “[t]he general rule... that a
government official is considered to be in privity with his or her
governmental employer... since the suit is in essence really against
97
the government.”
Minnesota explicitly abandoned the requirement of strict
98
mutuality, but its refusal to apply collateral estoppel in the instant
case seems an unjust return to allowing “one who has had his day in
99
court to reopen identical issues by merely switching adversaries.”
94. Id. at 660–63.
95. Id. at 657 (citing State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 658–59 (Minn. 2001)).
96. Id.
97. 47 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 623 (2008) (noting that this general rule only
applies when the official is involved in the litigation in their official capacity).
98. Aufderhar v. Data Dispatch, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Minn. 1990)
(discussing that strangers to the prior action may be affected by the ruling even
without a showing of strict identity). See also Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm'n on Civil
Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn. 1982) (setting forth the requirements for a
defendant who was not a party to earlier proceedings to claim collateral estoppel).
99. Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass’n., 122 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal.
1942). Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court in a landmark opinion,
expressly noted the abandonment of strict mutuality based on the thought that
“[n]o satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the requirement of
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The following analyzes the privity and interrelationships of state
agencies to understand the wall that Minnesota constructed to
separate the respective civil and criminal tracks in DWI
proceedings.
B. The Conflicting Functions of Government Agency?
The majority’s first justification for denying collateral estoppel
is the determination that the state and the Commissioner of Public
Safety have important differences in authority and are therefore
100
101
The general rule is to the contrary, but finding
not in privity.
that different authoritative functions exist between government
agencies is one justifiable rationale for an exception to the rule
otherwise holding government agencies to be in privity with one
102
Cases that depart from the general rule finding privity
another.
between government officials are based in large part on the
thought that the unique responsibilities of the respective agencies
are not represented at each proceeding and that consolidation may
interfere with each government official’s “proper allocation of
103
authority.”
The majority draws much of its support for this conclusion
through the premises cited to in State v. House, State v. Miller, and
104
These cases are marshaled in support of the notion
State v. Fritz.
that privity does not exist because despite litigating similar
questions, one involved state agency is not able to pursue the
mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should be
precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is
difficult to comprehend.” Id.
100. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 661 (Minn. 2007). Government
agencies are generally estopped from relitigating identical issues, but “exceptions
may be warranted if there are important differences in the authority of the
respective agencies.” 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR D. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1006 (2d. ed. 2002).
101. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 623 (noting that governments and
governmental agencies and their officers are in privity with one another).
102. 18A WRIGHT, supra note 100, § 1006.
103. 50 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS § 869 (2008). Discussing this exception, the article
cites Juan C. v. Cortines, 89 N.Y.2d 659 (1997). This case is cited in support of the
proposition that a school administrator could relitigate an evidentiary suppression
in an effort to suspend a student through the administration’s unique authority to
protect other students and therefore was not in privity with the city attorney, who
was responsible for prosecuting the delinquency action. Id.
104. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660 (citing State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 425, 192
N.W.2d 93, 94–95 (1971); State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1165 (Conn. 1987); State v.
Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 124 (W. Va. 1995)).
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determination of guilt or innocence during the administrative
105
While the referenced cases do speak to the state
proceeding.
agencies’ ability to fulfill their authoritative goals, the more
genuine focus of those cases is the procedural divergence between
106
a criminal court and an administrative hearing.
1.

State v. House
107

In ruling on the DWI proceeding State v. House,
the
Minnesota Supreme Court held that an attorney representing the
state in a DWI criminal prosecution did not have the authority to
make a plea bargain that would dismiss the penalties of a
108
subsequent implied consent proceeding. The court explains that
the state has authority to act in criminal proceedings, but “has no
109
Rather, it is the Commissioner of
authority to act in civil cases.”
Public Safety who is authorized by the state of Minnesota to act in
110
Before moving on to discuss privity, the
the civil cases.
Minnesota Supreme Court asserted these points of law from House
to reject Lemmer’s argument that the commissioner and the
111
district attorney were the same party.
The first reason that House is inapplicable in the present case is
that although subdivision 1(c) of the Minnesota Statutes section
388.051 does authorize the Commissioner of Public Safety to
represent the state at the civil case, the statute also clearly
authorizes the attorney general to represent the state at a civil
112
This essentially affords
matter by request of the Commissioner.
the state the option of having either of its designated attorneys
direct the civil case, illustrating that any lack of authority cannot be
describing “authority” in the statutory sense.
105. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660 (citing Fritz, 527 A.2d at 1165; Miller, 459
S.E.2d at 124) (using the cases to reiterate the proposition that just because parties
are interested in same facts they are not necessarily in privity).
106. Id. at 660. The majority relies on Miller and Fritz for the proposition that
government agencies may not be in privity simply for having the same goals in the
proceeding. Id. at 660–61. The dissent argues this is an incorrect marshalling of
Fritz and Miller because “the probable cause determination in Lemmer's implied
consent proceeding . . . [was] made de novo by a judge, not an administrative
officer.” Id. at 671 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
107. House, 291 Minn. at 425, 192 N.W.2d at 95.
108. Id.
109. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 660.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 660–61.
112. MINN. STAT. § 388.051 subdiv. 1(c).
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Furthermore, the denial of privity in House was made
regarding an analysis of a distinguishably different point of law.
The very narrow authoritative question that House turned on was
whether allowing the attorney at the criminal case to waive part of
the civil penalty interfered with the Department of Public Safety’s
express and solitary authority to later impose its sanctions on
driver’s licensure. The House court analyzed this more specific
113
issue and only stated in dicta that the parties were not the same.
This question of authority is irrelevant to the resolution of
Lemmer’s case, which turned on collateral estoppel being applied on
a complete and final evidentiary ruling, not the anticipatory waiver
of other parties’ rights. Employing House for this proposition is
insufficient to distinguish the parties in Lemmer because the parties
shared the same goal and rights: attempting to get the evidence
admitted. House was essentially a ruling that one party could not
act to affect a right that was specifically reserved to the other
114
However, this does very little to distinguish the parties’
party.
authority in Lemmer, because the right to litigate evidentiary rulings
is not exclusively reserved to either party.
2.

State v. Fritz

After determining that the state and the Commissioner were
not the same party, the court then addressed the reasons why they
are also not in privity. The Fritz court speaks to the differences in
procedure that exist between a criminal trial and the findings of
the administrative review by the Connecticut Department of
115
The court writes that “the state’s interest
Consumer Protection.
in having guilt or innocence determined is not adequately served
in an administrative proceeding because... the state’s attorney has
no control over the timing, substance or litigation of charges
lodged against the defendant by the department of consumer
116
This notion highlights one of the fundamental
protection.”
misapplications of the rule, which is the presumption that the
authority of review by the Connecticut Department of Consumer
113. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 668 (discussing the contradictory classification of
parties in House, stating “[b]ecause it was unnecessary in House to decide whether
the parties were identical, any statements we made about the relationship between
the parties was necessarily dicta.”).
114. State v. House, 291 Minn. 424, 425, 192 N.W.2d 93, 95 (Minn. 1971).
115. State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1167 (Conn. 1987).
116. Id.
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Protection is sufficiently analogous to a Minnesota implied consent
hearing. This is a substantial component in the logic supporting
Minnesota’s conclusion that privity does not exist between the state
117
and the Commissioner, but the holding in Fritz is based more so
on the difference in venue than the differing authoritative roles of
118
the parties.
The apparent problem in relying on the Fritz case arises from
the notion that the case refused to find privity because of the
unfairness to the state’s ability to perform its authoritative
functions of “investigation and prosecution of criminal matters”
without relitigating facts that had previously been ruled on under
administrative review by the Connecticut Department of Consumer
119
The Fritz court held that the rulings of an
Protection.
administrative proceeding would not invoke the protection of
collateral estoppel in a subsequent criminal action because to hold
contrarily would interfere with the state’s duty to investigate and
120
prosecute criminal activity.
For this reason, Fritz is not sufficiently analogous to Lemmer in
that the Fritz court describes only the divergence between the
state’s role in a criminal proceeding vis-à-vis a quasi-judicial
administrative review, devoid of civil or criminal procedural rules
and further devoid of a state-appointed attorney participation.
Without these safeguards in place, a government attorney may not
be afforded a venue that would properly ensure that the
government could achieve its authoritative purpose. However,
because the Lemmer case was conducted under the procedural rules
of a district court and under the direction of a government
attorney, it is difficult to find the deficiencies of procedure that
enabled the Fritz court to deny privity.
3.

State v. Miller
121

State v. Miller is another case relied on by the majority that
speaks to the pursuits of state agency interests at a quasi-judicial
administrative proceeding as they differ from the subsequent
criminal proceeding. In Miller, the West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Services was represented by the state Attorney
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 662.
Fritz, 527 A.2d at 1167.
Id.
Id.
State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1995).
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General, illustrating a situation more analogous to the instant case
than Fritz for exemplifying a scenario in which the state agencies
were formally represented as parties in both the civil and the
122
Despite this similarity to Lemmer—the fact
criminal proceedings.
that the state was a party to both proceedings—the Miller court
focused a substantial fraction of the opinion on the notion that the
authoritative roles were frustrated by procedural differences that
123
exist between quasi-judicial rulings and those of a criminal court.
The court explains that for collateral estoppel to apply, the
“prior decision must be rendered pursuant to the agency’s
adjudicatory authority and the procedures employed by the agency
124
must be substantially similar to those used in a court”. The court
further concludes that “the Grievance Board has no authority to
125
resolve a criminal matter.”
Application of this logic to Lemmer
seems an unmerited expansion of the West Virginia approach
because both actions convened against Mr. Lemmer were in district
court, where the authority and procedures are incontestably similar
to “those used in a court.” In addition to the obvious procedural
differences between a district court and an agency hearing, the
reasoning of the Miller court should not have been extended to
Lemmer because it cannot be said that the county attorney or the
presiding district court judge who administered Lemmer’s
preceding civil case lacked the authority to resolve criminal matters
or the unfair procedural disadvantages that were present in Miller.
The majority’s reliance upon Miller for similar arguments
seems less misplaced than in Fritz, but it still relies on arguments
founded upon the divergences in procedure and venue. The prior
ruling in Lemmer was not made before an administrative body in a

122. Id. at 127.
123. Id. at 123.
124. Id. (citing to syllabus point two in the case of Vest v. Bd. of Educ. of County
of Nicholas, 455 S.E.2d 781 (W.Va. 1995) for the proposition that “[f]or issue or
claim preclusion to attach to quasi-judicial determinations of administrative
agencies, at least where there is no statutory authority directing otherwise, prior
decision must be rendered pursuant to agency's adjudicatory authority and
procedures employed by agency must be substantially similar to those used in
court; in addition, identicality of the issues litigated is a key component to
application of administrative res judicata or collateral estoppel.”)
This
proposition is quoted herein to highlight the difference in the comparisons being
made in Miller to that of Lemmer. Miller was an examination of the similarity
between proceedings under the rules an administrative agency to a court, not
between the comparison of two different sets of court rules as in Lemmer.
125. Id. at 123.
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126

regulatory capacity; it was in fact made in district court.
In an
apparent effort to evade “differences in the quality or extensiveness
127
the Minnesota
of the procedures followed in two courts,”
Supreme Court relies on Miller and Fritz to avoid unfairly
disadvantaging state prosecutors.
However, in doing so, it
mislabeled these differences in venue to enable the district court to
contradict a judgment made by the same court. The Fritz case
acknowledges the risk of this specific danger, warning that “the
128
same court must not be allowed to reach conflicting rulings.”
Rulings of this nature seem to have become even more
difficult to rely on in light of very recent developments in
Minnesota case-law. In September 2008, in the case Friends of
129
Riverfront v. City of Minneapolis, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
said of finding collateral estoppel, “[w]e do not apply the doctrine
rigidly, and our focus is on whether the application would work an
130
The court goes on to write that the administrative
injustice.”
ruling will stand for the purposes of collateral estoppel where “the
131
Finding
administrative body acted in a quasi-judicial capacity.”
that the administrative agency was acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity, the court of appeals held that the party desiring to sue was
defensively estopped by the ruling of the prior administrative
132
An argument like this from the court of appeals does
hearing.
significant damage to the theories of varied authority and unfair
procedural divergence within an administrative proceeding that
the Minnesota Supreme Court stated would not serve as a basis for
Lemmer’s invocation of collateral estoppel.
C. Full and Fair Opportunity
1.

Different Attorneys

The majority’s next argument posits that the parties are not in
133
privity because they are represented by different attorneys whose
126.
127.

State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 660 (Minn. 2007).
See State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 121 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1980)).
128. State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1165 (Conn. 1987).
129. 751 N.W.2d 586 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008).
130. Id. at 589–90.
131. Id. at 590.
132. Id.
133. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 662 (Minn. 2007) (noting that despite
the fact that a county attorney may request the assistance of the attorney general,
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respective levels of participation are “unclear.”
Clarity, however,
readily presents itself in the statutes controlling the manner by
which
the
government
agencies
choose
their
legal
135
The state is free to designate its attorneys as it
representation.
wishes and the statutes are very clear: no statute prohibits the
county attorney or the attorney general from appearing at either
136
The
the criminal prosecution or the implied consent hearing.
fundamental bases that the majority utilizes in determining the lack
of privity between the attorneys are the issues of self-interest and
137
the right to appeal.
Amidst its discussion of the extent to which the lawyers’
relationship affects a finding of privity, the court relied on quoting
the 1940 United States Supreme Court holding of Sunshine
138
Anthracite Coal v. Adkins. The court writes that the distinguishing
feature of a lawyer’s relationship to another party is “whether or
not in the earlier litigation the representative of the [government]
had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the
139
The Lemmer court mistakenly continues its
issue in controversy.”
analysis on this issue to determine that there was no privity because
the attorney in the later proceeding was not afforded the full
140
In Lemmer, the earlier
opportunity to litigate the issue.
proceeding was the implied consent hearing, in which the district
attorney achieved a valid and final adjudication of the issue in
controversy, and therefore under Sunshine, was in privity with all
other subordinate representatives of that government as it relates
141
to that issue.
the attorney general plays a very limited role in criminal prosecutions, and only
assists at the request of the county attorney or the governor). See MINN. STAT. §
8.01 (2006).
134. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663.
135. See MINN. STAT. § 8.01 (the attorney general may act as alternative counsel
in the implied consent proceeding); MINN. STAT. § 169A.53 subdiv. 3(b)
(permitting representation by attorney general during the DWI prosecution,
showing that together, these statutes explicitly state that either of the concerned
attorneys is free to attend and represent the state agency at either of the
proceedings in question).
136. MINN. STAT. §§ 8.01, 169A.53 subdiv. 3(b).
137. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 661.
138. Id. (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403
(1940)).
139. Id. (citing Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 403).
140. Id. at 660–61.
141. Sunshine, 310 U.S. at 402–03. “[The Commission] represented the
United States in that determination and the delegation of that power to the
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Beyond misinterpreting this United States Supreme Court
holding, the Lemmer court also disregards Minnesota’s preceding
trend in finding privity between the attorneys who manage DWI
142
In 1984, Minnesota acknowledged that criminal and civil
cases.
proceedings and punishments were administered under significant
differences that made it unfair for the county attorney and the
attorney general to have to participate in the litigation of the
143
other. However, the court of appeals reversed this determination
in 2001, holding that “over time, these differences have blurred
considerably in ways most closely bearing on the question of
144
The reversal of this notion led not only to Minnesota
privity.”
145
being out of line with many other jurisdictions, but also left
Commission was valid, as we have said. That suit therefore bound the United
States, as well as the appellant. Where a suit binds the United States, it binds its
subordinate officials.” Id. at 403 (explaining that rulings that are adjudged against
the government, or a commissioner of a subordinate agency, will be binding upon
the government and its subordinate agents).
142. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655, 660 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
143. State v. Juarez, 345 N.W.2d 801, 803 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984). The Juarez
court initially found the state and the county attorney were not in privity because
of the “essential differences” between civil and criminal proceedings that they
normally handled. Id. These notions that supported the absence of privity
between the governmental actors were considered good law until being overruled
by Victorsen. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661.
144. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661.
145. See Briggs v. State, 732 P.2d 1078 (Alaska 1987) (interests of the
Department of Public Safety were sufficiently represented since the issues were
fully litigated by another representative of the state); Shackelton v. Dep’t of Motor
Vehicles, 119 Cal. Rptr. 921 (Ct. App. 1975) (holding that parties to the
proceedings were the same and the doctrine of collateral estoppel applied to the
issue of whether the stop was valid and motorist successfully defended the criminal
charges by showing the arrest was unlawful and sought to preclude that issue in
the license revocation proceeding); State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 670 (Minn.
2007) (Hanson, J., dissenting) (“holding that the Oakland County Prosecutor and
the Michigan Department of Social Services are both creatures of the same
sovereign, so that the judgment in the administrative proceeding that the
department failed to prove facts necessary to terminate benefits precluded proof
of welfare fraud in the criminal proceeding”) (citing People v. Watt, 320 N.W.2d
333, 336 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982)); Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 670 (Hanson, J.,
dissenting) (“holding that the Department of Social and Health Services, which
had determined in a dependency proceeding that Williams had not intentionally
received overpayments, was in privity with the county prosecutor of the welfare
fraud crime because both ‘represent the State.’”) (citing State v. Williams, 937
P.2d 1052, 1057 (Wash. 1997)); State v. Summers, 513 S.E.2d 575, 578 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1999) (noting that privity must be determined by examining the substantial
relationships of rights between the parties and not merely on the basis of each
party differing in name), aff’d, 528 S.E.2d 17 (N.C. 2000). See also Brower v.
Killens, 472 S.E.2d 33 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the department of motor
vehicles was fully protected in the criminal case where the interests of the state
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Minnesota subject to the previously recognized risks of the
“institutionalization of a process whereby duplicative proceedings
146
are frequent with inconsistent outcomes a distinct possibility.”
2.

Self-Interest

Another blurred distinction is that which speaks to the selfinterest to participate under the increasing reliance that both
attorneys have upon each other to implement the emergent
penalties attached to DWIs. The Lemmer court writes that the state
147
This
had a “lack of interest in the outcome of the hearing.”
asserted lack of interest does not accurately describe the fact that
the Commissioner of Public Safety can now use prior criminal
convictions as ammunition for “lengthening the duration of
148
Conversely, “[p]enalty
administrative license revocations.”
enhancements are now available to criminal prosecutors by virtue
149
of license revocations pursuant to the implied consent statute.”
This evolution allows both prosecutors in the DWI suits to charge
penalties of greater degree based on the prior outcomes the other
agency achieves against defendants, and conversely rests the
effective prosecution of their desired case on the successful results
150
obtained by the other agency.
It is settled that the party in interest is the party “entitled
under the substantive law to enforce the right sued upon and who
generally, but not necessarily, benefits from the action’s final
151
These criteria are clearly satisfied by the interests of
outcome.”
were argued by the local district attorney); State v. Williams, 667 N.E.2d 932, 936
(Ohio 1996) (“[T]he state acts through its various agencies and entities, and the
Bureau of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the state. We conclude that the state of
Ohio is the real party in interest in both proceedings and the requirement of
privity as an element of issue preclusion is satisfied.”); State v. Griese, No. 03-3097CR, 2004 WL 2002492 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 9, 2004). The court of appeals in Griese
suppressed evidence under collateral estoppel because the district court already
decided the issue in a prior adjudication that was on the merits and to which the
state was a party. Griese, 2004 WL 2002492, at *4. The court focused on whether
the different burdens in the two proceedings would result in injustice against the
state, but ultimately concluded that it would not. Id. at *2. Therefore, because the
representatives in both the administrative and criminal proceedings were the State
of Wisconsin, collateral estoppel applied. Id. at *3.
146. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662.
147. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 663 (Minn. 2007).
148. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (8th ed. 2004).
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the parties in Lemmer because the state and the commissioner
152
The
benefit from a successful outcome in the other’s prior suit.
United States Supreme Court stated the principle more specifically,
positing that it is unfair and burdensome for the system to allow a
party with knowledge of a judgment’s potentially adverse effects to
take a “wait-and-see” attitude about the outcome of the prior suit
before determining that the party wants to relitigate in the event of
153
a loss.
Viewing the incentives of each party through the lens of the
aforementioned evolutions in prosecuting Minnesota DWI cases,
154
this “symbiotic” relationship alone should sufficiently overcome
the Lemmer majority’s determination that any self-interest did not
motivate the attorneys representing the state agency.
The
dissenting opinion also notes that the other competing interests
between the attorneys are irrelevant because both agencies had
155
authority to represent the state’s agenda. The court should have
agreed that the two attorneys were aware that they stood to benefit
from the action of the other and that both also realized that failure
to participate could cost them the ability to further prosecute issues
156
Beyond these apparent shared
resolved adversely to their goals.
interests, other courts have found privity due to common interest
because both attorneys in this situation are appointed to serve in
the common representation of state citizens and pursue the

152. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662.
153. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330 (1979). The court
expands the reasoning of the Blonder-Tongue decision to further abandon the
requirement of mutuality and allow offensive issues preclusion as long as each
party is adequately represented at the first action. Id. at 331. Following this rule,
issue preclusion can be used by a person who was not a party to the original suit.
Id. The Supreme Court discusses the situations in which application of nonmutual issue preclusion is fair. One of the factors to consider is whether the
estopped party’s interests were adequately represented in the first adjudication.
Id. at 330. The court goes on to say that one consideration in determining the
adequacy of the interests that are being represented is whether the party being
estopped could have joined and had the incentive to join the prior action. Id.
The court writes that part of the unfairness to defendants in requiring mutuality is
that “potential plaintiffs will have everything to gain and nothing to lose by not
intervening in the first action.” Id.
154. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662.
155. State v. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d 650, 666 (Minn. 2007).
If the
Commissioner had authority to represent the state in the implied consent
proceeding, the interests of the state were represented. See Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402–03 (1940).
156. See Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663.
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overarching objective of making the roadways safer.
The increased interdependence in prosecutions makes it
difficult to imagine why in 2007 the Minnesota Supreme Court
reverted to resting its argument on this separation of attorney
158
interests that had previously been called “a fictional construct.”
The failure of the state to communicate in an effort to aggregate
the prosecution of these identical interests wastes judicial resources
159
and congests dockets to cut against the public trust in our courts.
Most importantly, subjecting defendants to this type of
unpredictability results in “the potential for inconsistency....
[which] is among the most objectionable results of the present
160
system.”
3.

Notice to the Parties and the Right to Appeal

The last primary argument on which the court relies in
determining that collateral estoppel should not be applied is that
the state was denied a full and fair opportunity to be heard at the
161
implied consent proceeding based on notice and appeal.
However, this reliance appears unfounded because the state was
162
notified of its opportunity to attend the implied consent hearing,
and no statute bars either attorney from participating in either

157. See, e.g., State v. Summers, 513 S.E.2d 575 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (noting
that regardless of the particular issues in DWI cases that are charged, the real
interest of both the DMV and the State is to keep unsafe drivers off of the roads).
State v. Williams, 667 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ohio 1996) (“The state acts through its
various agencies and entities, and the Bureau of Motor Vehicles is an agency of the
state. We conclude that the state of Ohio is the real party in interest in both
proceedings and the requirement of privity as an element of issue preclusion is
satisfied.”).
158. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 661–62. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 169A.52 subdiv. 4
(increasing duration of administrative license revocations with prior license
revocation); MINN. STAT. §§ 169A.25–26 (elevating severity of DWI offenses to a
gross misdemeanor if the offender had a driving-while-impaired violation within
the past ten years under section 169A.095); MINN. STAT. § 169A.275 (increasing
the mandatory penalties for each prior driving-while-impaired violation that a
single defendant receives within a ten-year period); MINN. STAT. § 169A.28
(providing for mandatory consecutive sentences if the person has prior drivingwhile-impaired violations); MINN. STAT. § 169A.31 (elevating severity of alcoholrelated bus driving offenses to a gross misdemeanor if the offender had a prior
license revocation within the past ten years).
159. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 664–65 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
160. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d at 662.
161. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 663.
162. Id.
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163

proceeding.
As the dissent obviates, when a prosecutor is given
notice and an opportunity to participate in a hearing, that
prosecutor, at a later hearing, will be estopped from opposing the
164
binding effect of an order resulting from the earlier hearing.
The state prosecutor cannot claim to have been relying in
165
good faith upon section 169A.53.3(g) because the statute was
166
Furthermore, the state
overturned by the Brunclik injunction.
was entirely aware that the issues addressed in implied consent
proceedings are sometimes identical to those addressed in DWI
prosecutions and could be handled by either attorney who is
167
The state forwent its right to appeal the
notified to appear.
judgment when it disregarded the notice of its opportunity to
litigate a subject in which it had incentive to participate. This
failure to cooperate costs each department the resources consumed
by relitigation of the issues that could have been decided together
168
in one joint action.
D. Where Is the Brunclik Injunction?
This policy discussion also emphasizes that the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, reviewing this case de novo, refused to hear the
argument over the Brunclik injunction because it was not raised at
169
trial. The court “may not base its decision on matters outside the
record on appeal, and that matters not produced and received in
170
However, evidence was
evidence below may not be considered.”
received below; it was “evident that the district court was aware of

163. See Id. at 654 (observing that “[t]he district court took Brunclik into
consideration and issued an order adopting the reasoning of Brunclik and
dismissing the charges against Lemmer.”).
164. Id. at 663 n.7.
165. See id. at 659.
166. See id. at 654.
167. Id. at 655 (discussing the exact similarity of the issues presented in both
cases, noting that MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 subdiv. 1 controls the criminal DWI
elements that determine whether the defendant operated or had physical control
of any motor vehicle, was under the influence of alcohol, and had an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more). The court held also that MINN. STAT. § 169A.52
subdiv. 4 determines the exact same issue of whether an individual is operating or
in physical control of a motor vehicle. Id.
168. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 14.9 (4th ed. 2005)
(noting the costs of trying the same issue twice).
169. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656.
170. Plowman v. Copeland, Buhl & Co., Ltd., 261 N.W.2d 581, 583 (Minn.
1977). See also MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 103.04 (2006).
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171

the Brunclik decision.”
The supreme court’s failure to apply
judicially created law regarding collateral estoppel was based on the
thought that the district court was aware of the Brunclik decision,
but the record does not indicate that Lemmer sought to enforce
172
The fact that the court was aware of this
the Brunclik injunction.
injunction should have also precluded the statute from being
allowed to stand as a matter of comity, which is an option of the
judiciary only in situations where the judiciary’s authority will not
173
be in conflict with the statute. Refusing to apply this injunction is
essentially a failure by the court to uphold its prior understanding
of the separation of powers and a forfeiture of the judiciary’s right
to mandate its own procedures. This further corrodes the public
trust, allowing a seemingly applicable rule of procedure to be
ignored to produce immeasurably inconsistent results.
E. Why Isn’t This Double Jeopardy?
The obvious response to the majority’s argument is to
conclude that this ruling sacrifices the constitutionally guaranteed
rights under the Fifth Amendment, which guarantees protection
against “‘a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal...
[or] conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for
174
The doctrine can be subtly distinguished
the same offense.’”
from res judicata based claims in that collateral estoppel bars
relitigation of facts, while double jeopardy bars prosecuting
“conduct identical and/or similar to conduct for which he had
175
already been prosecuted.” The Supreme Court has held that two
mechanisms overlap to the degree that “[t]he question is no longer
whether collateral estoppel is a requirement of due process, but
whether it is a part of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against

171. Lemmer, 736 N.W.2d at 656.
172. Id. at 656.
173. See State v. Lindsey, 632 N.W.2d 652, 659 (Minn. 2001). The court noted
that it has “occasionally permitted a statute to stand as a matter of comity, even
where the legislature has encroached somewhat upon a judicial function, so long
as the statute does not conflict with this court's inherent authority to make the
final decision.’” Id. at n.2.
174. United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
175. United States v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that
the government is collaterally estopped from prosecuting defendant for issues that
had been resolved adversely to the government in a prior civil suit).
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double jeopardy.... We do not hesitate to hold that it is.”
The critical test set forth by the Supreme Court to distinguish
the situations in which double jeopardy can be implicated is one
that examines “what conduct the State will prove, not the evidence
177
Because the aspects of
the State will use to prove that conduct.”
the conduct that the state must prove in the instant case are
identical in both the criminal and the civil suits, the resolution of
the double jeopardy argument must necessarily look beyond the
Lemmer opinion, which did not directly address double jeopardy.
One possible justification for a court’s reliance upon the
presumption that double jeopardy was inapplicable can be found
in the Miller case discussed previously. Miller argues that double
jeopardy cannot be invoked when the desired civil punishment
178
The Supreme
“has not been recognized as a criminal sanction.”
Court has also addressed this distinction by explaining that “the
only proscription... is that the Government may not criminally
prosecute a defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and
then bring a separate civil action based on the same conduct and
receive a judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of
179
In determining whether a
making the Government whole.”
second penalty is part of an effort to make the government whole,
“the defendant is entitled to an accounting of the Government’s
damages and costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact
180
constitutes a second punishment.”
In the instant case and in many DWI cases, the government
cannot assert any actual damages; therefore, almost any civil
penalty would meet the Supreme Court definition of double
jeopardy punishment. In light of the fact that “implied consents
have become means to enhance the charges and to impose
181
mandatory/consecutive penalties,” a strong case could have been
presented on Lemmer’s behalf that the prosecution of his conduct
by way of the illegally obtained evidence was in fact double
jeopardy. While the issue of collateral estoppel in future cases that
involve multiple government agencies seems unpredictable by
176. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 442, 445 (1970).
177. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990).
178. State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114, 123 n.14 (W. Va. 1995) (discussing that
courts have never considered imposition of civil penalties, specifically termination
of employment, as a criminal sanction).
179. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 451 (1989).
180. Id. at 449.
181. Frederic Bruno, Perspectives on the Law, 58 BENCH & B. MINN. 36 (2001).
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Lemmer, future defendants should argue that this type of relitigation
is barred from being prosecuted based on conduct under the Fifth
Amendment rather than by the common law doctrine of collateral
estoppel as applied to evidentiary rulings.
V. CONCLUSION
In Minnesota, the doctrine of collateral estoppel reflects
common law principles evolving to protect vital safeguards of
individual liberties and reducing the constantly escalating stress
182
upon judicial resources. The Lemmer decision establishes the rule
that the Commissioner of Public Safety and his state employer are
not in privity, defying the general rule of privity between
government agencies and denying the application of collateral
183
This certainly ensures the state will be fully heard in
estoppel.
both the civil and criminal proceedings of a DWI, but at what cost
to the judiciary and the individual defendant? It is axiomatic that
the inequity and confusion caused by this failure to apply collateral
estoppel will challenge the reliability of our courts, amplify the cost
184
of litigation, and predict an uncertain future for an “essential
185
part of the Constitution’s prohibition against double jeopardy.”

182. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Reed, 647 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002)
(discussing benefits of doctrine).
183. See 47 AM. JUR. 2D JUDGMENTS § 623 (2008) (stating general understanding
of privity between state and officials).
184. See, e.g., Ill. Farmers, 647 N.W.2d at 560.
185. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 448 (Black, J., concurring) (noting the
importance of collateral estoppel as it relates to the similar protections against
being tried twice for the same conduct under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss2/5

30

